


Last in Line, Last in School 2008

How donors can support education for children affected by conflict and emergencies



Save the Children

Rewrite the Future

Last in Line, Last in School 2008

How donors can support education for
children affected by conflict and emergencies



The International Save the Children Alliance is the world's leading independent children's rights organisation, with members in 28 countries and operational programmes in more than 100. We fight for children's rights and deliver lasting improvements to children's lives worldwide.

This report was written by Janice Dolan in Save the Children UK's Education Team on behalf of the International Save the Children Alliance.

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*Cover picture: Children look in through the door at an accelerated learning class in the Democratic Republic of Congo where one in three children has never been to school.
Photo: Rachel Palmer/Save the Children*

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
CAFS	Conflict-affected fragile states
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DFID	Department for International Development (of the UK)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EFA	Education for All
EPDF	Education Programme Development Fund
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
G8	Group of Eight
GNI	Gross National Income
IDA	International Development Association
INEE	International Network on Education in Emergencies
LICs	Low-income countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MICs	Middle-income countries
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
NESP	National Education Strategic Plan
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
UIS	UNESCO Institute for Statistics
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UPE	Universal primary education
USAID	United States Agency for International Development



Mungwakonkwa, 10 (right), and his friend Bahogwere, 12, in Nyanguenzi district, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). They are both in year one of Save the Children's accelerated learning programme, which helps children who have missed out on school to catch up. Mungwakonkwa and his family left their village two years ago because of ongoing conflict.

"I'm very happy to be going to school – school saved me from hard work. The happiest day of my life was when I received my school equipment. I wanted everybody to see me on my way home, and to know that I go to school."

Mungwakonkwa's father says, *"We left our home village because we were looking for safety. Even if we're still living in difficult conditions here, we're happy to be alive in a safe place and to see our children get the opportunity to go to school for free. To me, giving my children an education is investing in their future. I want them to break the chain of poverty and expect a better life than the one we're living now."*

One in three children in the DRC has never been to school. Most girls and children involved with the armed forces have had little or no education. Lack of investment in education over a number of decades means the quality of teaching is poor. Basic resources (such as classrooms and textbooks) are non-existent in many areas, and parents cannot afford the fees to send their children to school. At present, government spending on education is inadequate, at just 6% of the national budget.



MADHURI DASS/SAVE THE CHILDREN

Unlike many girls her age in Afghanistan, Basira, 10 (pictured left with her teacher), goes to a government school in Mazar e Sharif. After successfully attending a Save the Children accelerated learning centre, she is now in grade 4.

“The learning centre was quite far from my house. This school is pretty far, too. I have to walk for about half an hour every morning to get here. But, I think it’s worth it.”

“It’s good to be able to study. At first, no one at home thought it was important. Now, when a wedding invitation arrives for my family, I can read it to my mother. This has made her very happy.”

“I wear my hair short like a boy, so that I can go alone to the market to sell bread when my mother doesn’t feel well. My aunt cut it, and my mother doesn’t mind because she knows it’s safer for me to go out of the house looking like this.”

When I grow up, I want to be a doctor. I know I’ll have to study for many years to become one, but I’ll carry on with my studies. I want to help people who are sick.”

Sixty per cent of girls aged 7–13 are out of school in Afghanistan. Female literacy is just 13%. Many girls are prevented from getting an education because their parents will not let them travel to school after they reach puberty. Those who do manage to get to the government-run formal schools find they are overcrowded and ill-equipped due to years of conflict and under-investment in education. Classes are often held in tents, and in two or three shifts a day. There are few teachers, and even fewer trained teachers, and practically no learning materials in these schools.

Executive summary

Thirty-seven million children living in conflict-affected fragile states remain out of school, denied their right to education and the opportunity to lift themselves and their communities out of an endless cycle of poverty and conflict. With the capacity of their governments weakened, and education systems destroyed as the result of years of conflict and crisis, these children face a bleak future unless external support is forthcoming. Despite recent donor rhetoric acknowledging the need to address the question of education in these contexts, the international community is still failing to prioritise support to education in those countries furthest from achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS).

This report updates Save the Children's 2007 publication *Last in Line, Last in School: how donors are failing children in conflict-affected fragile states*, which exposed the international community's neglect of education in CAFS and in emergencies. *Last in Line* highlighted the stark disparity between education aid to middle- and low-income countries and that made available to CAFS. The latter receive only one-fifth of total education aid, despite being home to half the world's out-of-school population. One year on, the picture remains gloomy: one in three children in CAFS never go to school, and although there is growing consensus about the need to address the challenges of education in CAFS, the overall increase in education aid to CAFS has been minimal.

In recent years an expanding body of literature concerning education in fragile states and humanitarian crisis has emerged. This, combined with international pressure from many international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), has led to greater political attention being paid to this issue. The

increased attention was most notable at the first-ever international donors' conference on education, 'Keeping Our Promises', in May 2007, when a number of high-profile donors, including the Netherlands, the European Commission, Norway and the UK, spoke of the need to tackle education in fragile and conflict-affected states. Disappointingly, however, little new money was made available for any country. Although the growing political profile of education in CAFS is encouraging, the most recent data shows that this has not yet been matched by funding. Education commitments to CAFS increased slightly from \$1.6 billion in 2005 to \$1.9bn in 2006, and basic education commitments increased from \$0.85bn to \$1bn. While any increase in funding is to be welcomed, it is important to note that these countries need an estimated \$5.2bn in external basic education aid each year to achieve universal primary education (UPE), and therefore much more still needs to be done.

Good quality education gives children the hope of a better future, it stimulates economic growth, and helps build peaceful societies; without it, children and their countries face a bleak future. Evidence in this report (and elsewhere) shows that donors can and do support education in CAFS. Mechanisms are available, but not enough money is going through them and, consequently, education in CAFS remains underfunded. Aid still tends to be focused on countries that are perceived as easier to support: other low-income countries (LICs) not affected by conflict and fragility, as well as middle-income countries (MICs). In fact, despite being home to half of the world's out-of-school children, CAFS receive less than one-quarter of basic education aid. In addition, an analysis of overall official development assistance (ODA) reveals that although CAFS do receive donor

support, donors do not prioritise education in CAFS as they do in other countries, despite the dire need. Only 5% of ODA to CAFS supports education, compared with 13% in the case of other LICs.

Aid to education in CAFS needs to be increased, by donors allocating a greater proportion of their ODA to education, and making more aid available for education in general. In addition, donors should ensure a more equitable distribution of aid based on need. It is estimated that \$9 billion is needed annually to achieve UPE, and in 2006 the amount of aid for basic education fell short of this by \$4bn. Unless donors step up to the mark and contribute their fair share to education, children in CAFS as well as other LICs will be deprived of the chance to go to school. The G8 countries, in particular, are among the worst offenders, with five out of the eight giving less than 25% of their fair share of the external financing requirement needed to achieve UPE.

As well as increasing aid to education in CAFS, donors must support education for children in emergencies. This is of fundamental importance, to ensure that children have the benefits that education can bring in emergencies – a sense of normality, protection, the acquisition of skills for survival, and hope for a better future – as well as to ensure that systems and capacity are not undermined or even totally destroyed during crises. Only five donors currently include education in their humanitarian policy, and this is reflected in their prioritisation of aid to education in emergencies. Even some of the strong advocates of education, such as the UK government, are failing children in acute emergencies because their policies do not make education a core component of all humanitarian responses. With the formation of the Global Education Cluster there is hope that more donors will now recognise the importance of education in emergencies, and adequately resource it.

National governments have an obligation under international human rights law to provide all children in their countries with access to primary education;

achieving this depends on national capacity and willingness. In reality, however, many governments in CAFS lack the capacity, resources and, in some cases, even the political will to meet their obligations. But this does not mean that children in these countries should simply be forgotten. In order to get more aid to CAFS it is crucial to address the problem of barriers within the existing aid architecture, which tends to reward 'good performers' and work against CAFS. It is true that in many countries donors can encounter difficulties in releasing resources because there are none of the usual underlying partnership agreements in place and there are perceived to be trust gaps; however, they must find flexible approaches to tackling immediate needs while working for longer-term sustainability. Donors must help children access education now by supporting approaches that also use the shorter route of accountability, enabling education to be provided through innovative projects and programmes that, in turn, can build local-level capacity, and give children access to good quality education that is immediately available and sustainable. This approach to education provision can also support longer-term sustainability and build accountability by building government capacity and systems. Lessons from Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) show that despite complexities, supporting education even in the most challenging of contexts is possible. Donors can enable children to go to school now while also building longer-term capacity and robust education systems for future generations.

We are halfway to the deadline for meeting the MDG of universal primary education, but 72 million children around the world remain out-of-school and half of them live in CAFS. In 2007 the education of children in CAFS and emergencies was finally acknowledged as a key issue on the international agenda. Now, 2008 must be the year when the rhetoric and commitments are turned into reality through concrete actions by donors and other international actors. 'Business as usual' isn't good enough; donors must act now to:

1. Increase long-term predictable aid for education in CAFS

This requires donors to:

- ensure that funding is equitable, with at least 50% of new basic education commitments going to CAFS
- prioritise education in CAFS, and ensure that at least 13% of ODA to CAFS is allocated to education (in line with the levels of support given to education in other LICs)
- increase basic education aid to meet their fair share of the \$9 billion annual financing requirement
- ensure the Education for All-Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) establishes and resources a fund to support CAFS
- adopt a flexible, dual approach to funding education in CAFS, supporting system-building while simultaneously supporting approaches to allow children to go to school now.

2. Include education as part of humanitarian policy and response

This requires donors to:

- include education in their humanitarian policies
- increase the allocation of education aid in humanitarian crises to a minimum of 4.2% of humanitarian assistance, in line with the needs for education
- commit themselves to supporting the Global Education Cluster and ensure it is adequately funded.

Foreword

“Children themselves, their families, and communities, prioritize education during and after armed conflict. Countless assessments of displaced populations, refugee leaders and community members specifically identify schooling as an immediate need and a priority humanitarian intervention for their communities, often coming before requests for food, water, medicine and even shelter.”

*Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review:
Children and Conflict in a Changing World,
forthcoming 2008*

During my visits to conflict-affected areas, I have witnessed how armed conflict can tear children’s lives apart, uproot them and brutalise them. I have also witnessed children’s resilience – even those who have been traumatised – and how, with support, they can play a central and important role in reintegration and development efforts. In the midst of conflict, and after, children tell us again and again that they want to go to school – that it is their hope for the future and for employment. We must protect children’s right to education and keep their hopes alive – even in the most difficult circumstances. We must also protect their schools from being attacked.

Elsewhere, it is possible that we might meet the Millennium Development Goal for education. But we are nowhere near meeting it in conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS). For children growing up in CAFS, the

reality is stark: 37 million are out of school, and outside the classroom they face violence, poverty and instability. Children in CAFS too often miss out on education aid when their governments cannot or do not meet their needs.

In CAFS, where circumstances are so difficult, education can be the greatest of investments. Where the least aid for education is available, education presents the greatest hope for children and their societies. More than a route out of poverty, it can be a route out of conflict itself. It is a return to normality, a key ingredient for longer-term reintegration strategies, and a lifeline to deal with the past and rewrite the future. Support education here and it can make a dramatic difference.


What more can we say to children who want to know why they are still last in line for school? We have already said a lot and promised a lot. The promises of Education for All were right. Now we must honour them with action and purpose.



Radhika Coomaraswamy
UN Special Representative for Children and
Armed Conflict

Conflict-affected fragile states

Country	Number of primary-aged children out of school
Afghanistan	2,082,000
Angola	800,000
Burundi	480,000
Cambodia	23,000
Central African Republic	287,000
Chad	594,000
Colombia	479,000
Côte d'Ivoire	1,223,000
Democratic Republic of Congo	5,026,000
Eritrea	308,000
Ethiopia	2,666,000
Guinea	501,000
Haiti	704,000
Iraq	552,000
Liberia	171,000
Myanmar (Burma)	487,000
Nepal	702,000
Nigeria	6,584,000
Pakistan	6,303,000
Republic of Congo	376,000
Rwanda	373,000
Sierra Leone	277,000
Somalia	1,231,000
Sri Lanka	47,000
Sudan	2,695,000
Timor Leste	3,000
Uganda	1,151,000
Zimbabwe	429,000
TOTAL	36,554,000



Conflict-affected fragile states

Source: UNESCO 2007; UIS database; UNICEF 2008 unpublished data

I Introduction

Children in all countries have hopes and ambitions for their future. These dreams reflect the potential of their country and the potential for change. A good quality education is a crucial factor in enabling them to fulfil their aspirations, and in many cases education may be their only hope. Yet millions of children are caught up in conflicts that they did not cause and humanitarian crises over which they have no control, and these situations can mean that they are denied the chance to go to school. We are halfway to the deadline for achieving the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of universal primary education (UPE), but 72 million children remain out of school and, of these, 37 million live in conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS)¹ (see Map opposite). These figures do represent a drop in the overall numbers of children out of school worldwide, as well as those out of school in CAFS.² However, CAFS still account for more than half the world's out-of-school children, despite being home to only 13% of the world's population. If UPE is to be achieved by 2015, urgent action must be taken to address the challenges facing CAFS.

In CAFS the capacity and will of governments to provide services such as education can be seriously undermined by years of neglect, political strife within countries and lack of resources. These challenges are often exacerbated by the impact of current or recent conflict, with systems, schools and capacity devastated by the conflict. In these contexts, external aid for education is vital; without it there is little hope of getting all children into school.

In 2007 Save the Children revealed the shocking extent of donors' neglect of education in CAFS and emergencies in *Last in Line, Last in School: How donors are failing children in conflict-affected fragile states*. This report showed that, overall, CAFS were receiving only one-fifth of all aid to education, despite being home to more than half the world's out-of-school children. It

also highlighted the disparities between education aid to other low-income countries (LICs), compared with that to CAFS – with donors prioritising education in their aid to other LICs but not to CAFS. Finally, the report drew attention to the neglect of education in humanitarian aid. Save the Children demonstrated the stark underfunding of education for children in CAFS in both development and humanitarian situations. Despite these clear disparities, international forums on education and donor meetings were rarely acknowledging the situation in CAFS, and CAFS were excluded from support from the main international funding mechanism for education – the Education for All-Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI).

Still last in line

One year on and there are some signs of progress. In particular, there has been greater acknowledgement by key donors and education actors of the need to pay special attention to education in CAFS and in emergencies if universal primary education is to be achieved by 2015.

During 2006 and 2007 political attention to education in CAFS grew, and there was an increase in the literature³ on education in fragile states, much of it commissioned by key donors in the sector – the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC), The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank. International non-governmental organisations (INGOs), many associated with the International Network on Education in Emergencies (INEE), have also made important contributions in analysis and in advocacy for increased spending in support of children's right to a good quality education

in emergencies and CAFS. Also, an interpretation of the overarching problems as ‘trust gaps’ (Sperling, 2006) has helped to focus on the need to resolve issues at country level in order to overcome donor unwillingness to invest more in education.

During 2006 and 2007 there were also a number of high-profile commitments to CAFS and education in emergencies, with the formation of a Global Education Cluster; an unprecedented \$201 million commitment announced by the Netherlands government to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) for education in emergencies, post-crisis transitions and fragile states; and the announcement of the UK’s Education Beyond Borders initiative, which consisted of £134m to several CAFS, £20m to UNICEF, and a new rapid-response capability to deploy skilled education professionals in humanitarian emergencies. The US Congress also reintroduced the Education for All Act in May 2007. This legislation brings the potential for significant increases in US funding for basic education in the coming years. If passed, the legislation would require the US government to support activities ensuring a continuity of education for children in countries affected by conflict throughout the crisis or conflict and during the transition to reconstruction and development.

At the first-ever high-profile Education Donor Conference, held in Brussels in May 2007, the need to pay attention to CAFS was given prominence by a number of key speakers, including Louis Michel (EC Commissioner), Paul Wolfowitz (World Bank), Gordon Brown (UK), Bert Koenders (Netherlands), Erik Solheim (Norway) and Robert Greenhill (Canada). Nevertheless, very little money was committed for education in any country. At the end of 2007 the EFA High Level Group meeting issued a communiqué that stated: “EFA partners should prioritize low-income countries, fragile, emergency and conflict-affected states, and sub-Saharan Africa” (EFA HLG, 2007, p. 4).

The work of the EFA-FTI and Fragile States Task Team over the past two years has made an important contribution with the development of the Progressive

Framework, which provides a useful mechanism for dialogue between partners in CAFS, and a trajectory towards full FTI endorsement. The annual report of the FTI, published in December 2007, stated that one of the six next steps for the FTI would be to “build on the momentum created through the UNICEF program for countries affected by conflict to ensure that the development of their education systems is included in the overall FTI process” (FTI, 2007, p. 7).⁴

Although the rhetoric and commitments during 2006 and 2007 are encouraging, the evidence from the data still shows there is a lack of real action, and a need for decisive responses. One year on from *Last in Line* the most recent data available through the OECD DAC (up to and including 2006) shows that education aid commitments to CAFS increased slightly from \$1.6 billion in 2005 to \$1.9bn in 2006, and basic education aid commitments increased from \$0.85bn to \$1bn. These increases are to be welcomed of course, but CAFS need an estimated \$5.2bn in basic education aid each year to achieve UPE. Therefore, much more still needs to be done.

To date, the international community is still failing to prioritise education for children, both in humanitarian crises and in CAFS. It is still failing to make one of the best possible investments in the future of a country, which would help the country to break out of a cycle of poverty, conflict and fragility: “To achieve turnaround from being a failing state, a country is helped by having a critical mass of educated people” (Collier, 2007, p. 94).⁵ Quality education also has the potential to protect children, to lift them and their families out of poverty and to contribute to a more stable and peaceful society,⁶ and without education the future prospects of many countries look bleak. Donors are failing to support these children’s rights or listen to their voices. They are failing to bring about real change for children in countries such as Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia.

The evidence in this report and elsewhere shows that it is *not* impossible – donors *can* support education in CAFS, and some *do*. Mechanisms are available to

support education in CAFS,⁷ but not enough funding is channelled through them. Business as usual won't deliver. Donors must show the political will to tackle the challenges of financing education in CAFS, and turn the positive words into concrete actions in a context-appropriate way.

For children living in CAFS and those affected by emergencies to have a chance of going to school, donors need to do two things:

- provide *adequate resources* for education in CAFS and emergencies
- *prioritise education in their policy, programmes and budgets* at the country level, and encourage national governments and international agencies to do the same.

With one in three children in CAFS out of school, and currently only five of the 28 CAFS on track to meet the education MDGs⁸ (UNICEF, 2007), there is a lot to be done – but the benefits could be significant. This year, 2008, could be an exciting one and a turning point for children in CAFS. With discussions taking place in the EFA-FTI on how to support CAFS, the UNICEF/Dutch initiative for Education in Emergencies, Post-Crisis Transitions and Fragile States expanding to include other donors, and the Cluster becoming fully operational, children in CAFS need no longer be *Last in Line*. But these changes and commitments need to happen now. Another generation of children cannot be allowed to miss out on their education.

2 Donor resourcing of education in conflict-affected fragile states and emergencies

Since the commitment to the EFA goals and MDGs in 2000, there has been an ongoing drive to ensure that adequate resources are available to meet the goal of universal primary education (UPE) for all children by 2015. The formation of the EFA-FTI in 2002, the commitments at the G8 and the UN Summit in 2005, and the reaffirmation at the most recent G8 meeting in Germany that “no country seriously committed to ‘Education for All’ will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by lack of resources” (G8, 2007, p.12), show the international community’s rhetorical commitment to supporting education. However, the international community has repeatedly failed to provide the resources needed to make UPE a reality. Even when funds are committed, disbursements are often slow to materialise. Furthermore, the resources fail to reach the countries with the greatest needs: those furthest from achieving the MDGs and with the greatest numbers of children out of school – the conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS).

This chapter analyses donor progress since last year’s report, *Last in Line, Last in School* (Save the Children, 2007a), using the most recent data available through the OECD DAC.⁹ It examines the situation in relation to the funding of education in CAFS and emergencies, making a comparative analysis between the group of 28 CAFS and 31 other low-income countries (other LICs).¹⁰ It then assesses particular areas where action is needed by donors, and identifies which donors should be doing more. Full details of the data sources,¹¹ limitations and methodology used in this analysis are given in Appendix 1. Individual donor analysis and profiles, with a summary of key recommendations by donor, are in Appendix 2. A table of comparative statistics illustrating the changes that have taken place

in individual donor performance since last year’s report (Save the Children, 2007a) can be found in Appendix 3.


The underfunding of education in conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS)

Low share of education aid allocated to CAFS

Progress since last year: No change in overall share of education or basic education aid allocated to CAFS. There remains a large disparity in the distribution of education aid based on need. While some individual donors (Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, UK) have improved their own distribution of education and basic education aid and moved to more equitable financing of CAFS and other LICs, other donors have not.

Action still needed: Improve distribution of education aid and basic education aid to CAFS to ensure that 50% of basic education aid is allocated to CAFS. Urgent action is needed by donors that still give a large proportion of their education aid to MICs, or have large disparities between the amount given to CAFS and that to other LICs.

With at least half of the world’s out-of-school children, CAFS represent some of the countries *least* likely to reach the MDGs. Yet, as Figure 1 illustrates, they receive less than one-fifth of education aid and less than one-quarter of basic education aid. An unacceptable one-third of all education aid is still allocated to middle-income countries (MICs) – those countries *most* likely to achieve the MDGs.

Figure 1: Distribution of education and basic education aid in developing countries (average 2004–06)

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) online database


The share of education aid and basic education aid allocated to CAFS hasn't changed since last year, but there has been an increase in aid classed as unallocated by income group and, hence, this is included in Figure 1.¹² Some of this aid will in due course be going to CAFS and other LICs through multilateral channels such as the EFA-FTI and UNICEF, and some of it will be going to MICs or regional initiatives.

Overall, there is a lack of global information on the current funding needs at a country level. However, based on the most recent needs analysis (Bruns, Mingat and Rakotomalala, 2003), there is an estimated annual external financing requirement of \$9bn¹³ for UPE to be achieved by 2015. The Bruns *et al* (2003) multi-country analysis showed that just over half of this total was required by CAFS.¹⁴ Therefore, progress towards achieving UPE

by 2015 depends on an increase in the overall level of basic education aid to \$9bn, and at least 50% of commitments for basic education being directed to CAFS. At present, CAFS are allocated only 23% of total basic education aid, so their share needs to double.

It is also clear that even if the numbers of out-of-school children are used as a proxy for need, the allocation of aid to CAFS is far too low.¹⁵ As Figure 2 illustrates, although CAFS are further from achieving the MDGs than other LICs, and have twice as many children out of school, they receive only about half as much basic education aid as other LICs.

“The allocation of aid to basic education is not strongly related to the share of out-of-school children.”
(UNESCO, 2007, p. 159)

Figure 2: Distribution of out-of-school children and basic education aid in low-income countries

Sources: UNESCO, 2007; UIS, 2005; UIS database; UNICEF, 2008 unpublished data; OECD CRS online database

Although there has been no change in overall global distribution of aid, there have been some significant shifts by individual donors to a more equitable pro-poor distribution of education aid. As Figure 3 illustrates:


- Ten donors (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA – those donors that are shown to the right of the trend line in Figure 3) are allocating more than 60% of their basic education aid to other LICs and CAFS.
- Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden also show reasonable equity in their distribution of aid to CAFS and to other LICs (with both categories receiving 30% or more of basic education aid). Over the past year there has been a slight shift by these donors to a more equitable focus on CAFS and other LICs.
- However, there are also some donors with large disparities in the distribution of basic education aid, including Canada, Switzerland and the UK, with the proportion allocated to CAFS being too low.

While donors need to move towards more equitable financing of CAFS and of other LICs, they also need to ensure that they are allocating the majority of their basic education aid to those countries with the greatest needs. It is therefore worrying that Figure 3 also illustrates that 12 donors (those to the left of the trend line) are allocating more than 40% of their basic education aid to MICs, or their aid is classed as unallocated. These donors include Australia, Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Spain, and of these, only the Netherlands and Norway have a high proportion of their aid classed as unallocated rather than as directed at MICs.

Although the European Commission (EC) is not shown in Figure 3, it is allocating more than 60% of its basic education aid to CAFS and other LICs. However, the share going to CAFS is too small, given their needs – only 24% compared with 40% to other LICs – and, hence, the EC needs to move towards a more equitable distribution of its basic education aid.

Figure 3: Comparing bilateral donor priorities in financing of basic education

Note: Bubble size represents per cent of fair share committed to basic education 2004–2006



Source: OECD CRS online database

Education neglected in CAFS

Progress since last year: Slight increase in the share of official development assistance (ODA) to education in CAFS from 4% to 5%. Despite this increase, there is still a large disparity between ODA allocated to education in CAFS and that allocated to other LICs, with 13% of ODA allocated to education in other LICs.

Action still needed: Increase priority for education as a percentage of ODA in CAFS until at least in line with that in other LICs – ie, from 5% to 13%. All donors, except Greece, need to do this.

There has been no change in the overall share of global education aid reaching CAFS, as illustrated above, and it is also apparent that donors continue to show reluctance to support education in CAFS. On average, between 2004 and 2006, \$114bn per year in total ODA went to developing countries; of this, \$40bn went to CAFS, compared with \$25bn to other LICs. Despite this, CAFS do not receive enough aid, given their population size and level of poverty.¹⁶ However, only a small percentage of total ODA is allocated to education in CAFS: on average, between 2004 and 2006 the proportion was only 5% in the case of CAFS, compared with 13% in the case of other LICs.


More aid for education in CAFS requires an increase in the overall volume of aid and/or a larger share of aid going to education. Several factors influence the share of aid allocated to education in any aid

programme; nevertheless, the size of this share can be an indication of whether donors are prioritising education compared with other sectors in their programmes. Even when aid to education is measured as a proportion of all social-sector aid, donors allocate more than twice as much to education in other LICs (26%) as they do to education in CAFS (12%), as Figure 4 shows. The other big difference between the two categories of country is in the aid allocated to ‘government and civil society’: 41% in the case of CAFS, compared with 17% for other LICs. While support for governance initiatives (including improving security and political reform) is obviously essential in CAFS, it should be accompanied by support for essential basic services, including education. Without education, it is unlikely that today’s children – tomorrow’s adults – will be able to participate effectively, be active and productive members of civil society, and increase the chances of CAFS breaking out of cycles of conflict and instability.

Individual donors also prioritise education in other LICs, but not in CAFS. Table 1 (overleaf) illustrates this disparity by showing that:

- 16 donors allocated 10% or more of their ODA to education in other LICs, but only five (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, the World Bank’s International Development Association [IDA]) allocated 10% or more of ODA to education in CAFS.

Figure 4: Distribution of total sector-allocable aid to social infrastructure and services in CAFS and other LICs (average 2004–06)



Source: OECD CRS online database

Table 1: The percentage of ODA committed to education in CAFS and other LICs by donor (average 2004–06)

	Other LICs		CAFS	
	% ODA committed to education	\$ millions (average 2004–2006)	% ODA committed to education	\$ millions (average 2004–2006)
Portugal	33	16	6	19
New Zealand	31	17	7	3
Canada	30	131	6	42
Netherlands	28	237	9	58
Greece	21	0.3	23	6
Ireland	19	27	12	21
UK	19	497	5	165
Belgium	18	34	6	38
Finland	17	30	9	11
France	16	289	5	144
Luxembourg	16	11	3	1
World Bank IDA	15	709	12	412
Sweden	14	66	10	47
Norway	13	56	9	50
Germany	11	138	4	95
European Commission	10	198	4	98
Spain	9	18	4	17
Austria	8	5	1	4
Italy ¹⁸	8	11	11	32
Denmark	7	51	9	26
Switzerland	7	16	1	2
Australia	6	27	0.4	1
Japan	5	200	3	101
USA	3	58	2	294

Source: OECD CRS online database

- the difference in the level of support that some donors provide for education in other LICs compared with their support for education CAFS is stark – greater than 20 percentage points in the case of Canada, Portugal and New Zealand and greater than 10 percentage points in the case of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the UK. These are all donors considered to be supportive of education, allocating a good share of their overall aid to education. However, it is clear that although they are providing high levels of support for education in other LICs, this is not the case for CAFS.

In addition, Table 1 illustrates that Australia, Austria, Denmark, Japan, Spain, Switzerland and the USA are all allocating less than 10% of their ODA to education in CAFS and other LICs, so they could do more to support education in these contexts. This is in contrast to the fact that donors advocate that national governments should allocate 20% of their national budgets¹⁷ to education. In recent months some members of the international community, including some donors, have been calling for a target to be set, for allocations to education, at 15% of ODA.

Aid architecture works against CAFS

Progress since last year: Higher profile given to education and the challenges facing CAFS, as well as the gap in the international aid architecture for supporting them.

Action still needed: International aid architecture needs to support CAFS by establishing a fund within the FTI to do this.

“There is also an urgent need to address several gaps in the international aid architecture for education. In particular, the educational needs of countries affected by conflict or emergencies are ill served by the current system which often allows children to fall between the cracks of humanitarian aid and development assistance.”

(FTI, 2007, p. 36)

It is obvious from the analysis above that aid is not getting to CAFS in the volumes needed to make an

impact on education. CAFS receive a limited share of global education aid, and donors are not prioritising aid to education within countries. Education in general is vastly underfunded, so one issue is obviously the overall amount of education aid available for all low-income countries. A larger amount of global aid is required for education in all these countries, with donors allocating aid according to needs. The current inequity stems from three causes.

First, aid should be allocated on the basis of needs. “A recent study of the behaviour of some individual donors concluded that while the [World Bank’s] IDA and the UK tend to allocate their aid to basic education according to education needs and poverty, others – including France, Germany, the USA and the EC – are more likely to be influenced by strategic and political factors” (Caillaud, 2007 cited in UNESCO 2007, p. 159). Unless donors allocate on the basis of needs rather than just strategic, political or historical factors, children in some countries will continue to miss out on their education. An agreed understanding of needs and global financing gaps is necessary, and donors should coordinate at international level to address these needs and gaps.

Second, the distribution of aid could be influenced by donors’ preference for certain funding mechanisms, such as direct budget support. Some donors, including the UK and the EC, use budget support in order to strengthen government accountability for provision of services, and to move away from previous uncoordinated project support by donors. However, while budget support has been used in some CAFS, such as Rwanda and Sierra Leone, it is not appropriate in those CAFS where there is insufficient government commitment to poverty reduction, weak public financial management or even limited political will or capacity to deliver services.

Third, like the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the EFA-FTI is based on the central principle of countries having results-orientated development plans in place for donors to align behind. The FTI compact means that country partners agree to develop national Education Sector Plans and demonstrate strong domestic commitment to education, while donors

agree to align their programmes with country priorities and coordinate support around one education plan. Donors can therefore encounter difficulties in releasing resources in countries where, as in the case of many CAFS, there is no real underlying partnership basis for doing so and there are perceived to be trust gaps. Although some short-term crisis financing is available through humanitarian aid programmes or from some donors, the overall focus of the aid dialogue for the last few years has been to bring countries into conformity with this model. Instruments for interim measures of support between emergency or crises situations and 'normal partner' stages are not yet clearly identified in the education sector.

This has also been the situation with the EFA-FTI, with countries encouraged to go for full FTI endorsement as the only way to obtain significant funds for education from the FTI through the Catalytic Fund.¹⁹ However, when Liberia was rejected for Catalytic funding in 2007 (despite being FTI endorsed), a turning point was reached that renewed the urgency for the FTI to resolve the question of how to support countries like Liberia, which have huge education challenges and great need of donor support and yet are unable to meet the requirements of the FTI compact. Some CAFS are scheduled for FTI endorsement in 2008 (Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Haiti and Uganda) and in 2009

(Angola, DRC, Republic of Congo, Eritrea and Nigeria [three or four states]). Given the Liberia experience, however, endorsement may not necessarily mean they receive extra resources through the Catalytic Fund. In addition, Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Nigeria (other states), Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Zimbabwe (countries with high numbers of out-of-school children) are not yet even scheduled to be endorsed. There is obviously concern about the likelihood of these countries meeting the FTI compact, given the weak capacity or lack of will in some of these countries. This means that some of the countries most in need of FTI support remain excluded from the very global mechanism established to accelerate progress towards achieving the MDGs.

There is therefore an urgent need for the FTI to address this gap in its support. In 2006 the government of the Netherlands responded to this gap in the aid architecture by starting work with UNICEF to see how they could address the problem and support CAFS. Significant discussions on this issue are now also taking place within the FTI (see Box 1). With a view to avoiding the creation of another global mechanism for education, and thus parallel structures, there are also discussions on how the UNICEF/Dutch initiative – which is attracting other donors, such as the UK – will link to the FTI.

Box 1: Making the FTI work for all children²⁰

The FTI acknowledges the structural limitation of existing aid architecture which currently works in a way that excludes millions of children – those living in conflict-affected countries or fragile states. The FTI itself is part of the problem, excluding countries whose governments do not have the political will and/or the

capacity to meet the conditions of the FTI to have a credible education sector plan and PRSP (or equivalent) in order to qualify for support.

The FTI therefore *needs to change*. It needs to become a single process with two designations: Interim FTI and Full FTI. The Full FTI designation would maintain the

Box I continued

high standards and credible seal of approval of the FTI using the current Indicative Framework. The interim designation would utilise the Progressive Framework to enable other countries, not yet able to meet the full FTI conditions, to benefit from increased financing through interim financing mechanisms to address their education needs and build up systems. "The Interim FTI status would allow countries to receive up-front funding and implement capacity development programs to ensure greater transparency and accountability, and at the same time move forward on some 'quick win' education programs to avoid sliding backwards into chaos" (Sperling, 2008).

In order to do this the FTI needs to be a financing mechanism with sufficient funds to support the interim status countries. This could be done by creating a new fund within the FTI to support these interim FTI countries. The fund could either be a second window within the Catalytic Fund or a new fund, specifically tailored for the profile of nations that are likely to be in the Interim FTI process.

This fund, in whatever form, should be overseen by the FTI Steering Committee, and countries applying for FTI Full or Interim status could continue to apply for and benefit from EPDF funding for developing plans and technical support. The actual operational details of such a fund would be decided by the FTI Steering Committee and would be based on a number of issues. These include whether the World Bank would continue to act as Trustee for the finances or whether there is an opportunity to link this fund with the UNICEF/Dutch financing – and, hence, that there was a role for UNICEF to play as a leading FTI partner working on education in conflict-affected countries and fragile states.

However, the new fund should work according to clear principles to ensure a continuing compact between development partners and country partners. As a starting point, these principles should include the following:

For the development partners

- Predictable funding should be provided for a minimum of three years – a time frame which is adequate for it to start to address education needs, act as a 'catalyst' for stabilising the system and attract new donors.
- Disburse financing quickly and within, at most, six months of the application.
- Disbursements and use of funds are to be allocated on the basis of understanding the needs at country level and where the gaps are.
- Funding is linked to the Progressive Framework and production of an Interim Education Strategy.

For the country partners

(Note: the term 'country partner' would apply to whoever is making the application for Interim FTI status. Ideally, this would be a government but in some cases it might be other organisations.²¹)

- There must be a coherent interim education strategy that meets immediate needs and longer-term development of the education system as well as supporting capacity development.
- The Interim Education Strategy must have been developed using the Progressive Framework to give a framework for planning and dialogue. It should indicate where on the Progressive Framework the country is at present, and where it is intending to go with the benefit of FTI funding.
- The strategy needs to address needs on a wide scale across the country (not just small projects).
- If the government is not the lead agency, the strategy should demonstrate links with government or de facto authorities. It needs to show how the government has been involved, and how the plan will build government capacity.
- The plan must include building accountability and transparency at country level, including support for civil society development.

More aid needed urgently for education

Progress since last year: Education and basic education aid levels have increased, owing to significant commitments by a number of donors (Netherlands, UK, France, World Bank IDA). Eight donors are now meeting 80% or more of their fair share compared to only four last year.

Action still needed: An increase of \$4bn in basic education aid is needed to reach the \$9bn external financing required each year to achieve UPE. To reach this target, donors must meet their fair share of the external financing requirement, with significant action needed by Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the USA. Donors also need to contribute to the FTI so that it can fulfil its mandate.

“External funding partners should raise levels of predictable and long-term financing to education in general and to basic education in particular.”
(EFA HLG, 2007, p. 4)


After a dip in commitments in 2005, in 2006 education aid and basic education aid commitments rose to their highest levels yet, as Figure 5 shows. A number of donors made only small increases in their

education aid, and the overall rise was due mainly to a small number of donors having significantly increased their commitments in 2006 (Netherlands by \$1.3bn, UK by \$791m, France by \$366m, World Bank IDA by \$348m). While encouraging, the total of \$5bn committed for basic education in 2006 still falls far short of the \$9bn needed each year for UPE to be achieved by 2015.

Between 2004 and 2006 an average of only 43% of total education aid was committed to basic education, below the 60% that some in the international community think should be allocated to basic education. However, the amount that individual donors commit to basic education varies widely among donors, from over 70% for Canada, Netherlands, the UK and the USA, to 20% or less for Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Japan and Portugal.


Disbursements²² – which represent actual spending on education – are still significantly, and worryingly, less than commitments. Disbursements do show an upward trend and they are less prone to fluctuations than commitments are, as Figure 5 illustrates. However, there is a four-year time lag before disbursements reach the level of commitments, implying an urgent need to speed up disbursements if the MDGs are to be met.

Figure 5: Education and basic education aid commitments and disbursements for all developing countries



Source: OECD CRS online database

Figure 6: Fair share contributions of donors to the \$9bn annual external financing requirement for UPE (based on average commitments from 2004 to 2006)²⁴



Source: OECD CRS online database/World Bank GNI (2006), Atlas Method

All 22 bilateral Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors are committed to achieving the EFA and MDGs and have policies in place that emphasise their commitment to these goals. However, very few donors are actually meeting their fair share of the external financing requirement,²³ as Figure 6 illustrates. Encouragingly though, whereas last year only four donors were meeting 80% or more of their fair share, this year there are eight: the Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, the UK, New Zealand, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland. However, 10 donors are contributing less than 25% of their fair share: France, Spain, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, Portugal, the USA, Italy, Austria and Greece.

The EFA-FTI has played a significant role in the drive to increase donor resources and commitments for education. The FTI has been able to demonstrate impact on education, and by the end of 2005 the 32 FTI countries had 60 million children in school, 12 million more than in 2000, and representing a

26% increase in five years (FTI, 2007). Nevertheless, with 33 countries already endorsed and another 10 expected in 2008,²⁵ there is growing concern about the financing gap for primary education. In addition to bilateral aid, donors have pledged a total of \$1.2bn since 2004 to the Catalytic Fund. These available funds will be sufficient only until mid-2008, however. The FTI Annual Report (2007) estimates that, overall, the FTI countries will need an average of an additional \$1bn in external support each year over the next three years.

Donors need to be contributing to the FTI, not just in policy and dialogue terms, but with resources, to enable it to deliver on its commitments. To date, 15 donors have contributed resources to the Catalytic Fund, but some of these contributions (those of Belgium, Japan and Russia) have been of less than \$10m. Only the Netherlands and the UK have made significant contributions of over \$100m. In 2008 donors need to increase their pledges and, in

particular, more resources are required from Belgium, Canada, Japan, Norway and Sweden, which have not committed anything for 2008. Donors that have never committed any funds to the FTI – Austria, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal and the USA – should start to do so immediately. Others have recently made their first commitments to the FTI in the past year, including Australia and Denmark, which is encouraging.

“We now have a model in place that works and it is time for the donors to move from promises to action... There is an urgent need both to increase aid for education and to make it more effective.”

(Desmond Bermingham, Head of the FTI Secretariat)²⁶

Education a low priority in emergencies

Progress since last year: Slight increase in humanitarian aid allocated to education, from 1.5% in 2006 to 1.7% in 2007. Formation of the Global Education Cluster.

Action still needed: Increase allocation of humanitarian aid to education to match the needs. Donors need to include education in humanitarian policy and responses.

Humanitarian aid plays an important role not only in rapid-onset emergencies, but in conflicts and chronic crises. These situations are common in many CAFS, making them particularly dependent on humanitarian

Box 2: G8 – time to pull your weight!

“The G8 will continue to work with partners and other donors to meet shortfalls in all FTI endorsed countries ... we will work together with other donors and recipient governments towards helping to fund long term plans provided by countries to ensure every child gets to school, with attention to low income countries and fragile states furthest away from the 2015 target of universal primary completion.”

(G8, 2007, p. 12)

These words were the commitment of G8 members at their annual meeting in Germany in 2007. The G8 members have committed themselves to doing the right thing and making a difference in education. However, as the analysis of the data above shows, they are not yet delivering on these commitments. They are not allocating enough aid to education and are not yet getting it to countries and children that need support. Of the G8 members only the UK can really hold its head up. The others, except Canada, all give less than 25% of their fair share to education – France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the USA.²⁷ And not only are they giving far too little, the money they do give does not go to support education in the poorest

countries, but in fact goes to many of the countries that are the most firmly on course to reach the MDGs.

The track record of the G8 members in supporting the FTI is also poor; only the UK has committed substantial amounts to the Catalytic Fund in recent years (\$270m), while the USA has not yet committed anything. France, Germany and Italy have all committed between \$11m and \$22m to the Fund, and Japan and Russia have committed less than \$5m. Canada committed \$17m in 2006, but has since made no further pledges, so could also be doing significantly more.

For the world's richest leading nations, their commitments to education and the children most in need are inadequate. Last year Germany hosted the G8, and it could and should be leading the way on making commitments and setting an example for others to follow. This year it is the turn of Japan, which will have its chance to show other G8 members how it can be done. It is another chance for all the G8 governments to turn words into actual commitments and action. For G8 members, it is time to pull their weight.

aid. On average, between 2004 and 2006, 13% of aid to CAFS was in the form of emergency assistance and reconstruction funding, compared with less than 3% in other LICs. All humanitarian needs are underfunded, but education has been one of the least funded in recent years. For example, in the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), in 2006 education was the second-least-funded sector, with only 26% of its needs being met. Encouragingly, in 2007, 38% of the education sector needs were met.²⁸ In reality, though, this means there are still significant funding gaps for education – for example, in Chad, “Agencies providing education are working on a shoestring. Of the \$287m that the UN and NGOs requested for all humanitarian operations in Chad for 2008, only \$15m was requested for education. And while donors funded 97% of the overall appeal, they gave only 12% of the amount requested for education.” (IRIN news report, 13 March 2008)²⁹

However, as discussed above, donors’ education policies and practices have tended not to include education in countries affected by conflict or in crises. Yet neither do humanitarian policies and practice prioritise education in these countries – with only 1.7% of humanitarian aid being allocated to education in 2007. Consequently, children in emergencies and crisis situations do not have access to education. Schools remain closed, teachers are unavailable, and systems and institutions are often largely destroyed and have to wait to be rebuilt when the ‘development’ actors move in, which may be years or decades later. As a result, children in these countries still fall through the gap between development and humanitarian responses by donors. The formation of the Global Education Cluster, which is co-led by UNICEF and Save the Children, will raise the profile of and, hopefully, catalyse funding for education in emergencies. However, to date, the Cluster is also struggling for funding, being the second-least-funded cluster in the global capacity-building appeal in 2007 (see Box 3).

As Figure 7 (overleaf) illustrates, bilateral donors’ record of supporting education in emergencies varies, with only five donors actually having policies to

Box 3: The Global Education Cluster

While not initially included as part of the humanitarian reform agenda’s cluster approach, the education cluster was approved at the end of 2006 in recognition of the importance of consistent, reliable and accountable educational programming in emergencies. Education ‘needed’ the cluster approach, as outlined in the global objectives of the cluster approach, to ensure: predictable sectoral leadership and accountability at the global level; strengthened mechanisms for system-wide preparedness and enhanced technical capacity; and enhanced partnerships and agreed common standards.


Cluster capacity building funds will be used to meet these objectives through:³⁰

- national capacity building
- developing coordination capacity and mechanisms for improved education sector response in humanitarian crises
- training programmes to strengthen capacity and preparedness of both humanitarian personnel and government authorities
- documenting and evaluating education responses in selected countries.

However, the global cluster capacity building appeal remains significantly underfunded, with only 27% of its requirements being met, through the contributions of four donors – Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Sweden.

support education in emergencies (Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway and Sweden). There are nine donors allocating 2% or more of their humanitarian aid to education and these include, not surprisingly, those five with policies in place. Eleven donors – Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the USA – allocate 1% or less to education in humanitarian aid. This is particularly surprising for the UK, a long-standing advocate for education, which extended its support to emergencies when announcing its

Figure 7: Percentage of humanitarian aid allocated to education by donor (average 2004–07)³²



Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service online database

‘Education Beyond Borders’ initiative in April 2007,³¹ yet still does not respond to children’s educational needs in emergencies.

Traditionally, many donors have not included education as part of their humanitarian policy, tending instead to prioritise other sectors such as shelter, food and water in the initial stages of an emergency. However, there is a sign that the humanitarian community is finally recognising the benefits and importance of providing education in emergency response. On average, between 2004 and 2007 only 0.4% of the EC Humanitarian Office’s (ECHO’s) funding was for education, demonstrating that ECHO has tended not to support education in emergencies. In February 2008, however, it launched a working document on children in humanitarian crises, which has a particular focus on education in

emergencies and a commitment to develop more operational recommendations for its humanitarian interventions in education, with ECHO recognising that “Within the context of crisis, school and structured educational activities represent a haven of normality where children can rediscover familiar routines. This is important for limiting trauma and helping children to come to terms with the situation they are in, lending education in emergencies an important psychosocial dimension... School can be a means of protecting children, in particular in the context of complex crises. It offers protection against recruitment to armed groups and against all other forms of violence, abuse and exploitation (most notably through forced labour)” (European Commission, 2008, p. 17 [translated from French by Save the Children]).

3 Making it happen: challenges and flexible approaches³³

The previous chapter illustrated the serious underfunding of education in conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS) and in humanitarian contexts. The challenge is how to address the inequitable funding of CAFS and how to ensure that aid is being channelled to education in these countries, and that the international aid architecture works for CAFS.

“A key question is how to channel aid to fragile states”
(UNESCO, 2007, p. 189)

In CAFS, problems concerning accountability and the capacity to manage and absorb funds, as well as the lack of political will to implement effective policies, are often cited by donors as the reasons why education is hard to fund. Certainly, CAFS present some of the most challenging environments, and donors need to be able to trust that their money will reach school children and help build an effective education system.

It is acknowledged that in countries whose governments are committed to education, and are able to put in place national education plans, progress is being made towards reaching the education MDGs. “The evidence since Dakar is clear: determined national governments have made progress in all regions and increased aid has worked to support this progress” (UNESCO, 2007, p. 9). The current aid architecture is built on this premise and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness drives donors towards seeking harmonisation, coordination and government ownership. Some CAFS can move towards this ideal because, although capacity may be weak, donors can engage with and support the government. However, in other CAFS, years of conflict and crises may have destroyed institutions, and governments lack the capacity, systems and often the will to provide education for all children. Consequently, it may not


be feasible for some of the standards expected in the Paris Declaration to be met. In these contexts donors can have substantial concerns about increasing their aid and they can often feel that they cannot make a contribution. However, while working in line with the OECD DAC (2005) principles of good practice for international engagement in fragile states,³⁴ including a “focus on state building as a central objective”, donors can, and must, also work to ensure that education services are available for children.

The challenge is therefore how donors can do this. ‘Risks’ may encourage donors to limit their support through government budgets and to continue in project mode. However, while this may slow down the longer-term development of the sector, it need not undermine the capacity of the state to deliver, if donors adopt flexible approaches that combine state-building with support to immediate service delivery. It is therefore important that while working towards the transition, donors maintain a level of flexibility that enables:

- partners within the education sector to continue to work together
- technical assistance to be provided to address government capacity constraints
- state capacity to be built while delivery of services is also ensured through a range of implementing partners.

The key strategic concern is therefore to develop ways – preferably a coordinated funding mechanism – that meet the short-term imperative for children to go to school, while balancing this with the need for longer-term sustainability. Such a mechanism should flexibly respond to needs and opportunities through both short- and long-run accountability routes (see Figure 8 overleaf).

Figure 8: Short and long routes of accountability



Source: Meagher (2005), adapted from World Bank (2003, p. 49)

The approach needs to be flexible – with donors tackling immediate needs while building for longer-term sustainability. However, if donors focus on taking the longer route of accountability without also investing in service delivery – for example, building national government capacity and democratic structure for state provision of education without responding to children out of school today – then millions of children will miss their entire education, and their countries face the risk of continuing in poverty and conflict.

Donors must help children access education now, supporting approaches that also use the shorter route of accountability. These approaches can enable education to be provided straight away through innovative projects and programmes, which should be closely aligned with the government as much as possible. At the same time they will be building local-level capacity to ensure access to good quality education on a sustainable basis. This applies not only to bilateral donors, but to the FTI and, as the FTI seeks alternatives to support CAFS, it will need to look at how to combine these approaches. (For more information, see Box 1: Making the FTI work for *all* children.)

Using a flexible approach can work, and has been done, most notably in countries where donors have a political imperative to engage and overcome the challenges. Even in the most difficult contexts, aid for education can make a difference, and can increase access to good quality education; progress may be slow in some cases, but in others more rapid, and it can be made with or without the national government capacity and will. Evidence for this and lessons for the future can be gathered from an examination and comparison of the situations in two very challenging contexts – Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Learning from experiences in Afghanistan and the DRC³⁵

In Afghanistan and the DRC the education challenges are huge. The DRC has an estimated five million children still not in school and Afghanistan at least 2.1 million; together, these two countries account for approximately 10% of the world's out-of-school children. In both countries, systems and structures have collapsed as a result of years of neglect and conflict. Nevertheless, there is some cause for

optimism. In Afghanistan, school enrolment in recent years has grown faster than in any other country (Global Campaign for Education, 2007), rising from less than one million children in 2002 to more than six million by 2006. Donor financing for education in Afghanistan has also increased significantly (see Figure 9) with, on average, 73% of education aid being allocated to basic education between 2004 and 2006.


In contrast, the DRC is struggling to make progress. Enrolments have increased only marginally and education aid has dropped since 2004 to only \$31m. Shockingly, despite the country's needs, only \$12m was committed in 2006 for basic education in the DRC. On the other hand, in the past 12 months there have been some larger commitments to education from DFID (\$50m) and the World Bank (\$150m), which may give grounds for some optimism in the DRC. The World Bank project (to which the DFID grant is also linked) does include grant effectiveness conditions, though. These seek to have a coherent reform process already in place – including reform of teacher pay mechanisms, school mapping and a teacher census – and this has meant delays in the disbursement of funds.

Different countries present contrasting pictures of progress and donor engagement, so assessing what

has worked in countries such as Afghanistan and the DRC is a complicated process. However, looking at these particular countries, some encouraging aspects do emerge in relation to recent changes in donor engagement and progress in education. An examination of these contexts also highlights some key lessons that donors should take into account when considering ways of supporting conflict-affected and fragile states to achieve education for all their children.

In Afghanistan the initial phase of donor support, from 2002 to 2006, was characterised by relatively weak capacity in the Ministry of Education (MoE), and this led to a diversity of poorly coordinated interventions from external partners. Nevertheless, there were some impressive achievements and a high rate of enrolment growth, with relatively strong donor support,³⁶ increased aid for education, and some efforts to coordinate activities. International and national NGOs were important partners in much of this work, either working alone, or through provincial and district education departments. These departments were themselves barely functional or with limited financial resources, but many were extremely dedicated, enthusiastic and effective within their limitations. Over the past four years there has been a substantial amount of activity of this kind, and it has had a notable impact on service delivery. Examples are BRAC's³⁷ Accelerated Learning

Figure 9: Education aid commitments and disbursements to Afghanistan and the DRC



Programme, which has reached more than 80,000 children, and Save the Children's programming, which has improved the quality of education for more than 125,000 children. At the same time, donors have worked towards a 'focus on state building as a central objective' – one of the OECD DAC (2005) principles of good practice for international engagement in fragile states. Despite the contextual constraints affecting capacity, donors to the Afghanistan education sector have been responsive to this principle. With the evident strengthening of will on the part of the MoE to address a trust gap, there has been greater focus on donor coordination and on more systematically supporting state structures to deliver education services.

The transition is not always smooth, and the MoE reported difficulties in securing the collaboration or contributions from some partners. However, there has been a shift from an emergency-oriented approach to a more clearly developmental approach in which strengthening state-run service delivery drives partnership arrangements – ie, a shift from concentrating on short route accountability to combining this with long route accountability. A key element in this approach has been the strengthening of government accountability for service delivery. This depends, though, on funding coming through the budget process rather than through externally funded pet projects of individual donors (Save the Children, 2007c). However, given the needs and challenges in the education sector in Afghanistan, it is likely that the government will remain heavily dependent on non-government implementing partners for some time, with resources from donors being channelled through the government budget. Donors working through a coordinated pool of funds will mean that the government is nevertheless in control of the education system and decisions affecting the budget.

Conversely, in the DRC donors have focused less on addressing immediate needs in the education sector and more on addressing state-building and building government capacity through a longer route of accountability. Major commitments to basic education – for example, from DFID and the World Bank – are primarily driven by a commitment to long route accountability. Their focus is clearly on the state as

service provider; delays and changes affecting sector governance are likely and will impede the flow of donor resources. In addition, delays have been caused in the release of recent aid to the DRC as the government works to meet the World Bank grant effectiveness condition of having a coherent reform process in place before funds are disbursed. The demand for education is there in the DRC, but the current donor approach is having little impact on education today, children still can't go to school, and yet another generation will miss out on their entire education. Therefore, donors should adapt their approach and use a funding instrument that can combine short route and long route accountability. This should be coordinated to allow central oversight, but be flexible enough to build on the multiplicity of sector partners – including non-government partners – that can support progress towards EFA goals.

Where there's a will there's a way

The Afghanistan and the DRC situations present two contrasting pictures of donor engagement and support for education. At times the picture is encouraging – donors are providing some support and looking at ways of building state capacity to deliver services in the future. The major difference in willingness of donors to invest is in part linked to the geopolitical importance of Afghanistan versus that of the DRC. This affects the respective levels of aid for education in the two countries. In the case of Afghanistan, there has been a huge change in education, which can be attributed, at least in part, to donors' willingness to engage and invest. Importantly, this demonstrates that donors can find ways to support education even in the most challenging contexts.

However, both countries still have huge needs and there is much more to be done by donors, whose willingness to invest should be guided by need and numbers out of school, not just in these two countries but in other CAFS as well. What is evident from the two situations is that in order to reach sustainable education systems in CAFS, education needs to be delivered on the ground now, and the government must be able to manage the delivery of education over time.

The experience of Afghanistan and the DRC demonstrates the complexity of achieving this:

- In the DRC there is hope that government capacity can be developed, and the external focus is on achieving this. In the meantime, however, the delivery of education on the ground is not happening – so children now are missing out.
- In Afghanistan, through the commitment of government and donors, there has been improvement in actual delivery, but until recently government capacity has lagged.

There is, therefore, a need both to develop government capacity and also to ensure immediate delivery on the ground. *We cannot say to children today in Afghanistan or the DRC, or any other country, that although we recognise their right to education, we will not provide opportunities to go to school because we*

need to develop the capacity of their government. Equally, we cannot say to children in the future that the reason that their education system is dependent on outside donors or organisations rather than on their own government is that we did not support the development of capacity when we had the chance to do so.

Despite the challenges, there are examples of education provision in the most difficult contexts, working with the governments and using flexible approaches to ensure that education needs are met in the short term, and that longer-term sustainability is built. Examples and lessons can be drawn from the experiences in these contexts of donors (see Box 4 on DANIDA) and INGOs such as Save the Children, International Rescue Committee, and Norwegian Refugee Council, over many years.³⁸

Box 4: Supporting education in situations of fragility, recovery and reconstruction: DANIDA's experience

In 2005, Southern Sudan was in the very initial stages of establishing the structure of a public administration system, including the education system. UNICEF was identified from all sides as the lead agency in education, working closely with the emerging Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) of the government of Southern Sudan.

As public administration structures and government institutions were still at a rudimentary stage of establishment, Danish funding was transferred to UNICEF³⁹ to help finance its support to MoEST in the planning and implementation of a two-pronged approach for:

- action to address the most urgent demands for education of children of primary school age
- longer-term development to begin to build up a coherent education system covering the whole of Southern Sudan. This would help to lay the foundation for coherent educational sector implementation and expansion, based on sequenced planning and budgeting, from the stages of recovery and reconstruction to longer-term development.

In using Danish funding, UNICEF is not an implementing agency, but operates through and with MoEST. UNICEF supports MoEST in the coordination between all partners within the emerging policy framework to ensure that their activities are mutually supportive.

The plan for immediate action was to address the timing and requirements to meet the basic needs of very rapidly increased school enrolment of girls and boys. Key aspects include provision of and support of teachers; supply of educational materials, with the main emphasis on textbooks; supply of teachers' instructional materials; classroom facilities; and basic administrative, managerial and supervisory support.

The longer-term development plan is to support MoEST in establishing a coherent education system, including its relationship with other parts of public administration and government institutions, and national planning relating to decentralisation.

Source: DANIDA (2007)

Therefore, we need to deliver on the ground and develop capacity. The learning from Afghanistan and the DRC is relevant for all CAFS. Donors must use flexible approaches to overcoming weaknesses in government capacity (and even at times political will)

to ensure immediate access to education, as well as investing in longer-term capacity development of national education systems and plans in CAFS. This applies both at national level and to the international aid architecture for education.

4 Conclusions

Half way to the deadline for achieving the MDG on education, 72 million children remain out of school. Half of these – 37 million – live in conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS). In 2007 the importance of education for children in CAFS and emergencies was finally acknowledged and became a high priority on the international agenda. Now, 2008 needs to be the year when rhetoric is turned into reality through concrete actions by donors and other international actors.

This report has shown that aid to education has increased, but is still insufficient for the education MDGs to be achieved. The distribution of aid is still inequitable and not enough of it reaches CAFS, given their needs and high numbers of children out of school. The percentage of ODA allocated to education in CAFS is low, indicating that donors engaged in these countries are not giving priority to education. Education also remains a low priority within humanitarian aid programmes.

However, there has been some progress since last year. Importantly, there is greater understanding of the challenges that must be overcome at country level, and increasing willingness of donors to find solutions to address these challenges. The Netherlands has led the

way by supporting UNICEF to increase resources for education in these countries. The FTI has endorsed and provided some resources to CAFS and is actively looking at how to put in place a fund within the FTI that could support CAFS specifically.

At country and international level there are lessons to be learned from donor experiences of engaging in countries such as the DRC, Afghanistan and Southern Sudan. Donors themselves have demonstrated the impact that aid can have; for example, aid has helped to increase enrolment rates in Afghanistan sixfold. Crucial to a successful impact in terms of immediate provision of education for children is that donors act now by adopting a flexible, dual approach to fund education in CAFS, supporting system-building while simultaneously supporting approaches to allow children to go to school today – as well as in the future.

It is a time for hope for children living in CAFS. However, if children in CAFS are to get the education they want, and have a right to, it is imperative that donors act now – they must support education in conflict-affected fragile states and emergencies and commit the resources needed to make education for all children a reality.

5 Recommendations

1. Increase long-term predictable aid for education in conflict-affected fragile states

This requires donors to:

- **Ensure funding is equitable, with at least 50% of new basic education commitments going to CAFS.**
Urgent action is needed by: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the UK, as well as the European Commission and the World Bank IDA.
- **Prioritise education in CAFS, and ensure that at least 13% of ODA to CAFS is allocated to education (in line with the levels of support given to education in other LICs).**
Urgent action is needed by: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA, as well as the European Commission and the World Bank IDA.
- **Increase basic education aid to meet their fair share of the \$9 billion annual financing requirement.**
Urgent action is needed by: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.
- **Ensure that the EFA-FTI establishes and resources a fund to support conflict-affected fragile states.**
Urgent action is needed by: All donors and the EFA-FTI Steering Committee.
- **Adopt a flexible, dual approach to funding education in CAFS, supporting system-building while simultaneously supporting approaches to allow children to go to school now.**
Urgent action is needed by: All donors.

2. Include education as part of humanitarian policy and response

This requires donors to:

- **Include education in their humanitarian policies.**
Urgent action is needed by: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the USA, as well as the European Commission.
- **Increase the allocation of education aid in humanitarian crises to a minimum of 4.2% of humanitarian assistance, in line with needs.**
Urgent action is needed by: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.
- **Commit themselves to supporting the Global Education Cluster and ensure it is adequately funded.**
Urgent action is needed by: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.

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Endnotes

I Introduction

¹ See Appendix 1: Country classification and methodology, for details on the country classification used in this report and for a full list of conflict-affected fragile states.

² The number of out-of-school children reported in CAFS fell from 39.2 million in 2006 to 36.6 million in 2007. Although some countries, such as Angola, saw their number of out-of-school children increase, several countries made progress, in particular Ethiopia and Nigeria, where the numbers of out-of-school children fell by 1 million and 1.5 million respectively.

³ See Bibliography for list of relevant literature.

⁴ The UNICEF Programme for Education in Emergencies, Post-Crisis Transitions and Fragile States has been funded by the Netherlands. For more information on the UNICEF programme see www.unicef.org

⁵ Education is considered to be one of only three crucial factors required to bring turnaround in fragile states. "Starting from being a failing state, a country was more likely to achieve a sustained turnaround the larger its population, the greater the proportion of its population that had secondary education, and... if it had recently emerged from civil war." (Collier, 2007 p.70).

⁶ Save the Children has recently launched a discussion document to generate global debate on the role of education in peace-building and conflict prevention. For more information see <http://www.savethechildren.net/alliance/media/newsdesk/2008-03-12.html>

⁷ See, for example, Save the Children (2007a) and SPIRU (2007), which gives examples of support to countries such as Nepal through a sector-wide approach; Afghanistan through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund; and Somalia through UN-led joint approaches. These demonstrate that aid can be provided to CAFS and can be used to improve the availability and quality of education.

⁸ When progress on the MDGs in CAFS and other LICs is compared, the CAFS are seen to be lagging behind. They have more children out of school (37 million compared with

18 million), a lower primary enrolment rate (71% compared with 77%), and a slightly lower female-to-male primary enrolment ratio (0.91 to 0.93). (Sources for these figures are UNESCO, 2007, UIS, 2005, UIS database and UNICEF, 2008 unpublished data from Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys.)

2 Donor resourcing of education in conflict-affected fragile states and emergencies

⁹ The most recent OECD DAC data available is for up to and including 2006. Last year's Save the Children report, *Last in Line, Last in School*, used data up until 2005. As 2007 data will not be available until early 2009, discovering whether the promises and rhetoric of 2007 have translated into commitments will not be possible until next year.

¹⁰ See Appendix 1 for further information on the country classification and a list of the 31 other LICs.

¹¹ Note that this report factors in the impact of budget support on education systems in developing countries in order to recognise that funding for education can be provided through budget support.

¹² Where donors have made commitments to regions or where recipients are unspecified, these have been labelled as 'unallocated' by income group (as in UNESCO, 2007). The proportion of aid unallocated by income group in 2006 was significantly higher than in previous years (8% of education aid and 6% of basic education aid was unallocated on average 2003–2005) and is therefore presented as a separate category in this year's report. The large increase is at least in part due to the Netherlands who made a commitment of \$1bn in 2006 which, at the time of writing, is classed as unallocated.

¹³ UNESCO (2006) estimates the annual global external financing required to achieve UPE in low-income countries as \$9bn at 2003 prices. At 2005 prices – the year upon which ODA figures quoted in this report are based – the external financing requirement is \$9.55bn. This report continues to use the \$9bn figure in order to be able to assess progress since last year's report (Save the Children, 2007a). The UNESCO estimate is based on a World Bank

simulation exercise run on 47 countries (Bruns *et al*, 2003), extrapolated for the whole low-income group and factoring in additional costs related to domestic financing, HIV and AIDS and conflict (for a fuller explanation refer to UNESCO, 2006).

¹⁴ To estimate the proportion of the \$9bn financing requirement that is needed in CAFS, Save the Children returned to the original World Bank 47-country simulation exercise (Bruns *et al*, 2003), finding that 58% of the external financing needs belonged to CAFS. Scaling up according to UNESCO's (2006) recommendations and as a proportion of the \$9bn, the financing requirement in CAFS is estimated to be \$5.2bn annually.

¹⁵ Even in terms of allocations of aid per child, the disparities are stark and not just a question of population size. A school-age child in an 'other LIC' is allocated \$9 basic education aid compared with \$8 in the case of a child in a CAFS. An out-of-school child in an 'other LIC' is allocated \$96 basic education aid – 3.5 times that for an out-of-school child in a CAFS, who is allocated only \$27. Between 2003 and 2005 an out-of-school child in an 'other LIC' was allocated on average 4.5 times more aid for education than an out-of-school CAFS child. The disparity between donor support to CAFS and that to other LICs, although slowly narrowing, is still too high.

¹⁶ Fragile states receive 43% less overall aid than their entitlement on the basis of population, poverty, policy and institutional performance levels (Levin and Dollar, 2005).

¹⁷ For example, through the EFA-FTI Indicative Framework.

¹⁸ At the time of writing this report, Italy had not reported fully on its breakdown of ODA to the OECD DAC. The data given here is therefore based on education aid for 2004 only.

¹⁹ This is the main funding mechanism for the FTI, after increased bilateral support provided by donors at country level. It was initially designed to provide transitional funding for countries until more donors came on board. However, it has recently been expanded to provide longer-term financing to any countries with a financing gap. In addition to the Catalytic Fund, small amounts of funding are also available through the Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) to support countries to develop their plans.

²⁰ How the FTI could work to support children affected by conflict was discussed recently at a meeting at the Council for Foreign Relations in Washington DC on 11th March 2008. The meeting discussed a number of options for the FTI which are outlined in Sperling (2008). The outcome of the meeting will be summarised

into a number of recommendations to be presented at the FTI meetings in Tokyo in April 2008.

²¹ In these cases there would need to be a lead agency that has engaged with, and consulted and coordinated with, other key actors in country, including the government. There would need to be some guidance on the circumstances in which a proposal from a non-state actor (or consortium of such actors) would be considered.

²² The OECD estimates coverage for disbursements to have been over 90% since 2002 (for DAC donors, the EC and UNICEF), from which date disbursement trends are analysed in this report.

²³ 'Fair share' is measured by the amount of basic education each donor should contribute to the external financing requirement for UPE, according to its gross national income (GNI). For countries with a high GNI value, such as the USA, their fair share of the financing gap will be large and they will need to commit large amounts of aid to meet it. For example, while the USA committed on average \$472m a year between 2004 and 2006, this represented only 14% of its fair share. However, Norway, with a lower GNI, committed \$113m and met 149% of its fair share.

²⁴ Note the Netherlands' fair share is actually 441% and Greece's is only 4%.

²⁵ This includes three which were expected to be endorsed in 2007 but were not – Bhutan, Burundi and Zambia, and those scheduled for 2008 – Central African Republic, Chad, Haiti, Malawi, Papua New Guinea, Uganda and Vanuatu.

²⁶ The quote relates to the FTI Annual Report; see the FTI website <http://www.fasttrackinitiative.org/content.asp?ContentId=1144>

²⁷ As Russia is not included as one of the 22 DAC bilateral donors by the OECD, it is not included in this analysis. However, it is a member of the G8 group of countries.

²⁸ In 2006, requests for education amounted to 4.2% (\$212m) of the funding in the CAP, but only 26% (\$55m) of this was covered in the appeals. In 2007 the requests amounted to 3.2% (\$162m) of the funding and 38% (\$62m) of this was covered.

²⁹ See <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/ee98d0319da7f0baa89279f9ddf4528e.htm>

³⁰ For more information on the global cluster capacity-building appeal, see <http://ochaonline.un.org/cap2005/webpage.asp?Page=1566>

³¹ DFID press release 5 April 2007: <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/pressreleases/education-beyond-borders.asp>

³² The term 'humanitarian aid' in this graph includes Consolidated Appeals, natural disasters response, bilateral aid and all other humanitarian funding.

3 Making it happen: challenges and flexible approaches

³³ This chapter draws on research carried out by M Greeley in the DRC and Afghanistan, commissioned by Save the Children. More information on the research is available in two unpublished papers; see Greeley (2007a) and Greeley (2007b).

³⁴ 'Fragile States: Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations', OECD DAC High Level Meeting, 3–4 April 2007.

³⁵ See Appendix 4 for more information on DRC and Afghanistan.

³⁶ Donor support encompassed the whole sector, with major investments in school construction, reconstruction and

rehabilitation, teacher salaries, teacher training, curriculum development and textbooks. USAID, DFID, the World Bank, and the Afghanistan Multi-Donor Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) have been prominent financiers of the sector but several other donors (including Canada, Denmark, Germany and Japan) have made bilateral contributions in addition to money channelled through the ARTF.

³⁷ BRAC is the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, an NGO originating from Bangladesh. BRAC International now works in several countries to alleviate poverty and empower the poor.

³⁸ See, for example, recent research commissioned by Save the Children in Afghanistan, Southern Sudan and Zimbabwe (Save the Children, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e).

³⁹ Danida chose UNICEF for its programme as it was concerned about the amount of time it would take to get the Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) in Southern Sudan up and running, and therefore wanted to use a mechanism that would provide faster support for education.

Appendix I: Country classification and methodology

Country classification

While there is a general acceptance on what constitutes a ‘fragile’ or ‘failing’ state – conflict, a lack of political will and/or capacity, high levels of inequality, extreme and prolonged economic hardship – there is currently no international consensus on a definition for such states (UNESCO, 2007). However, a number of organisations including the World Bank and OECD DAC have developed lists of fragile states based on their own criteria for, and definitions of, fragile states.

Save the Children has compiled its own list of ‘conflict-affected fragile states’ (CAFS) in order to analyse issues relating to education in those ‘fragile’ states experiencing income disparity, weak governance and inequality, and which are also affected by conflict. Countries categorised as conflict-affected are those included on the Project Ploughshare¹ list of states as having experienced at least one armed conflict during the period 1995 to 2004, or those classed as ‘critical’ on the 2006 Failed States Index,² which assesses violent internal conflicts. Countries categorised as fragile are those classified as either ‘Core’ or ‘Severe’ on the 2006 Low Income Countries Under Stress³ list, which categorises countries according to their Country Policy and Institutional Assessment rating.

This analysis results in 28 conflict-affected fragile states (listed below), which, because of conflict and related fragility, have particular difficulty in fulfilling children’s right to education. This list is the same as that used in Save the Children’s earlier publication, *Last in Line, Last in School* (2007a), which analysed donor financing of education in CAFS. Save the Children has used the same list and definition of CAFS in this report in order to analyse trends, even

though individual lists, such as the Failed States Index, are updated yearly.

The majority of the CAFS are low-income countries. However, five of the group are classified as lower middle-income countries according to the World Bank definition⁴ (Angola, Colombia, Congo, Iraq and Sri Lanka). As data is only provided for nation states, and some conflicts only affect certain regions within a country, not every country experiencing conflict is specified in this list.⁵

Conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS)

Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Timor Leste, Uganda, Zimbabwe.

For purposes of comparison, the external financing of CAFS is considered within the larger group of low-income countries (LICs). The report draws comparisons throughout between CAFS and a group of 31 ‘other low-income countries’ (other LICs), which are listed below.

Other low-income countries (other LICs)

Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Comoros, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, India, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Papua New Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia.

Data sources

This report relies on secondary data sources from the International Development Statistics (IDS) online database on aid flows,⁶ compiled by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).⁷ The analyses presented in this report are based primarily on data from the OECD Creditor Reporter System (CRS), which gives detailed information on individual aid activities, including information on aid flows to education from the 22 DAC countries,⁸ the World Bank, the European Commission, the African and Asian Development Funds, the Inter-American Development Bank Special Fund and UNICEF.

Humanitarian aid flows to education, which in some conflict-affected countries are a major source of education financing, are not reported by the DAC. In order to account for such financing, this study refers to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service for its analysis of humanitarian aid to education.⁹

Methods

To obtain an accurate profile of official development assistance (ODA) flows supporting the education sector, the analysis takes into account reported education ODA *and* general budget support – which is crucial for the development of educational systems. The FTI Secretariat (2006) suggests that between 15% and 25% of general budget support benefits the education sector. This report accounts for 20% of general budget support as being allocated to the education system. In addition, basic education aid includes reported basic education ODA *and* 10% of budget support *and* one-third of ‘Education – Level Unspecified’. Assuming that, for instance, 50% of the budget to education is allocated to primary education (an FTI benchmark for this indicator), it would represent around 7.5% to 12.5% of the total and therefore, for the purposes of this study, an average of 10% general budget support is included in ODA flows to basic education. In addition, one-third of the category ‘Education – Level Unspecified’ as reported

on the OECD DAC database (which accounts for education sector budget support) is also included in the analysis of basic education aid, in line with the Global Campaign for Education (2006) recommendations.

Calculating ODA flows to education

Total education aid = Education ODA
+ 20% General Budget Support

Basic education aid = Basic Education ODA
+ 10% General Budget Support
+ one-third ‘Education – Level Unspecified’

Data presentation

As amounts committed to education aid are likely to fluctuate over time, they are analysed here over several years in order to examine consistent trends in donor behaviour. The OECD states that the database is virtually complete since 1999, and commitment trends from 1999 onwards are examined in this report.

Where a distribution of aid is examined, or figures are shown for the amount of aid committed on a per-child basis, this has been expressed using average amounts over the period 2004–06.

Prior to 2002, disbursement data was incomplete. Disbursement data is referred to from 2002, at which point the OECD estimates coverage to be more than 90%.

All data presented is based on the calendar year and all financial figures are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2005 US dollars. Humanitarian aid flows to education are stated as averages over the period 2004 to 2007, and are recorded in current US dollars. In this report, \$ represents US\$.

Where donors have made commitments to regions or where recipients are unspecified, these have been labelled as ‘unallocated’ by income group (as in UNESCO, 2007). The proportion of aid unallocated by income group in 2006 was significantly higher than in previous years and is therefore presented as a separate category in this year’s report.

Limitations

The OECD database does not account for all international aid flows. Aid flows reported by the DAC can differ from those reported by donors in country. This can be due to reporting criteria and differences in reporting years, as well as differences in what is recorded as aid.¹⁰ However, the OECD database does constitute the most comprehensive internationally comparable data source for the largest donors. In addition, as this report examines only public official flows from OECD donor countries and multilateral organisations, the recent expansions in South–South cooperation and private aid flows are not presented here.

It is also worth noting that where bilateral donors channel aid through multilateral organisations, a proportion of this will be used for education and reported as multilateral, rather than bilateral, education aid. Therefore, the individual bilateral profiles may not reflect all funds committed to education by each DAC donor, although these funds are included in the total education aid figures. Furthermore, as a significant proportion of education aid is recorded on the database as being ‘unallocated’, this cannot be analysed by recipient countries or income groups, making it impossible to assess how much of this aid reaches CAFS.

The IDS database records funding to basic rather than primary education. Basic education, according to the OECD, comprises early childhood education, primary education and basic life skills for youth and adults. As data is not available for primary education, basic education is used as a proxy in this report for primary education, particularly when discussing commitments and progress towards the achievement of universal primary education (UPE).

Notes

¹ <http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-TitlePageRev.htm>

² http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140

³ <http://www.worldbank.org/licus/>

⁴ The World Bank classifies economies by income groups according to gross national income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. Removing these countries from an analysis of education aid does not alter the conclusions of this report.

⁵ For instance, the Occupied Palestinian Territories are not recognised as a nation state and therefore are not listed. Indonesia, India, Russia and Senegal all experience conflict in certain regions of their respective countries, but as they have relatively strong governance as a whole, they are not listed as CAFS.

⁶ Accessed 28 January 2008 at www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline

⁷ This is the principal body through which the OECD cooperates financially with developing countries.

⁸ At the time of accessing the database the data for Italy was not complete. Overall ODA levels had been reported for up to and including 2005, but no further details or breakdown for the year 2005 had been recorded. For 2006 no data was recorded. Hence, education aid for Italy had not been reported for 2005 and 2006. This report therefore analyses Italy’s commitments to education in 2004, the last year for which data is available.

⁹ <http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/>

¹⁰ See, for example, Nowell (2006) which highlights methodological differences in US appropriations figures and those reported by DAC. For the US at country level, the size of the foreign aid budget is frequently measured in terms of annual appropriations approved for international assistance programs.

Appendix 2: Donor profiles

Note: Official development assistance (ODA) figures are stated as averages 2004 to 2006, and humanitarian aid as an average 2004 to 2007.

All donors

9% ODA to education

43% education aid to basic education

Prioritisation of education

(% ODA to education):

5% in CAFS

13% in other LICs

Humanitarian aid to education:

1.6%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):

China 694


Bangladesh 501

India 423


While aid to education has increased and is at its highest recorded level, it has not yet reached the levels required to achieve UPE, and there remains a disparity between allocations to CAFS and those to other LICs. Therefore, donors still need to:

- increase aid for basic education to reach the required \$9bn a year to achieve UPE
- increase allocations of education aid to CAFS
- increase priority for education in CAFS
- include education as part of humanitarian policy and response.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Australia

9% ODA to education

39% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 29%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 0.4% in CAFS, 6% in other LICs

Humanitarian aid to education: 4.5%


Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):

Indonesia 32
Philippines 22
Papua New Guinea 16


Encouragingly, education aid has risen for the first time since 2003; however, since last year the share of the education aid allocated to CAFS and other LICs has decreased and humanitarian aid to education has decreased. To improve its performance this donor needs to:

- significantly increase basic education aid to meet its fair share of the financing requirement
- drastically increase allocations of education aid to CAFS and other LICs
- significantly increase priority for education in CAFS and other LICs
- include education in humanitarian policy.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Austria

10% ODA to education

4% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 5%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 1% in CAFS, 8% in other LICs

Humanitarian aid to education: 0.3%


Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):

Turkey 19
Bosnia and Herzegovina 13
Serbia 8


Encouragingly, commitments to education in developing countries are on the rise for the first time since 2000; however, commitments to CAFS and other LICs remain disappointingly low. Still needs to:

- drastically increase basic education aid to meet fair share of financing requirement
- significantly increase allocations of education aid to CAFS and other LICs
- give increased priority to education in CAFS and other LICs
- include education as part of humanitarian policy and response.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Belgium

11% ODA to education

21% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 33%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 6% in CAFS, 18% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 1.9%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$): Democratic Republic of Congo 13, Rwanda 6, Vietnam 6


Since last year Belgium has improved its fair share contribution slightly and improved its allocation of basic education aid to CAFS and other LICs. However, still needs to:

- significantly increase basic education aid to meet fair share of the financing requirement
- give increased priority to education in CAFS
- include education as part of humanitarian policy and response.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Canada

10% ODA to education

75% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 61%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 6% in CAFS, 30% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 2.1%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$): Mali 47, Mozambique 27, Bangladesh 20


Continues to be a good supporter of education in other LICs, particularly for basic education. Since last year Canada has increased slightly its support for education in CAFS but can improve its performance further by:

- increasing basic education aid to meet fair share of financing requirement
- significantly increasing allocations of education and basic education aid to CAFS
- giving increased priority to education in CAFS.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Denmark

7% ODA to education

54% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 81%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 9% in CAFS, 7% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 4.8%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):
Benin 13
Nepal 12
Bolivia 10


Continues to be a good supporter of education, but there has been a significant decline in education commitments since 2004, which is worrying. Since last year, Denmark has improved allocation of basic education aid to CAFS and improved its humanitarian aid to education. However, it still needs to:

- increase basic education aid to meet fair share of the financing requirement
- reverse the declining trend in education aid to CAFS and other LICs
- increase allocation of education aid to CAFS.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Finland

10% ODA to education

48% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 53%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 9% in CAFS, 17% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 1.0%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):
Mozambique 12
Tanzania 9
Zambia 7


A fall in education aid in 2006 is a cause for concern and has particularly hit other LICs. However, CAFS also continue to receive a very small amount of aid compared with their needs. Therefore needs to:

- increase basic education aid to meet fair share of financing requirement
- increase allocation of education aid to CAFS
- include education as part of humanitarian policy and response.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



France

17% ODA to education
 9% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 21%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education):
 5% in CAFS
 16% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 0.2%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):
 Morocco 195
 Algeria 152
 China 102


Encouragingly, there has been a slight shift towards increased allocations for basic education in CAFS and other LICs this year, but two-thirds of education aid continues to be allocated to MICs. A high proportion of aid is still supporting scholarships for foreign students, leaving little money for basic education. This donor still needs to:

- drastically increase basic education aid to meet fair share of financing requirement
- significantly increase allocations of education aid to CAFS and other LICs
- give increased priority to education in CAFS
- include education as part of humanitarian policy and response.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Germany

12% ODA to education
 14% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 18%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education):
 4% in CAFS
 11% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 1.0%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):
 China 157
 Cameroon 39
 Turkey 38


Although education commitments have increased this year, the increase has been mainly for support to tertiary education. Moreover, a significant proportion of Germany's aid does not reach those countries most in need – CAFS and other LICs. Therefore, Germany still needs to:

- drastically increase basic education aid in order to meet fair share of financing requirement
- increase allocations of education aid and basic education aid to CAFS and other LICs
- increase priority for education in CAFS
- include education as part of humanitarian policy and response.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Greece

15% ODA to education

9% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 4%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 23% in CAFS, 21% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 0%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$): Albania 9, Afghanistan 3, Turkey 2


Although Greece has increased its share of education aid going to CAFS, it has fallen behind significantly in meeting its fair share of the financing requirement – dropping from 27% last year to just 4%. It needs to:

- drastically increase basic education aid to meet fair share of financing requirement
- significantly increase allocation of education aid to CAFS and other LICs
- include education as part of humanitarian policy and response.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Ireland

12% ODA to education

59% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 80%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 12% in CAFS, 18% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 2.7%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$): Uganda 11, Mozambique 9, Zambia 8


A good all-round education donor, making progress on meeting its fair share of the UPE external financing requirement since last year. However, still needs to:

- increase basic education aid to meet full fair share of financing requirement
- include education as part of humanitarian policy.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Italy

9% ODA to education

39% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 7%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 11% in CAFS, 8% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 2.1%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):
Somalia 13
Ethiopia 7
India 4


Has allocated a good proportion of its education aid to CAFS up to 2004. However, lack of recorded data for the past two years makes it difficult to assess how Italy is supporting education. Therefore, needs to:

- ensure timely reporting of education aid data to the OECD-DAC
- drastically increase basic education aid to meet fair share of financing requirement
- give increased priority to education in CAFS and other LICs
- include education in humanitarian policy.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Japan

7% ODA to education

20% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 16%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 3% in CAFS, 5% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 3.4%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):
China 382
Vietnam 48
Indonesia 41


Although total education aid commitments increased in 2006, the amount committed to CAFS fell and humanitarian aid to education has declined. Japan also spends much of its ODA to education on supporting scholarships for foreign students to study in Japan, leaving little for basic education. Still needs to:

- drastically increase basic education aid to meet fair share of financing requirement
- increase allocation of education aid to CAFS and other LICs
- give increased priority to education in CAFS and other LICs.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Luxembourg

14% ODA to education

36% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 113%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 3% in CAFS, 16% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 0%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$): Senegal 5, Cape Verde 5, El Salvador 4


Luxembourg is now fulfilling its fair share of the external financing requirement. However, it needs to improve its performance by:

- drastically increasing the share of education and basic education aid to CAFS
- increasing priority of education in CAFS
- including education in humanitarian policy and response.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Netherlands

17% ODA to education

79% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 441%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 9% in CAFS, 28% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 2.3%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$): Indonesia 59, Mozambique 44, Bangladesh 39


The Netherlands remains a leading education donor, and should be congratulated for exceeding its fair share of the external financing requirement and giving increased priority to education in CAFS and other LICs this year. However, a large proportion of its education aid is classed as unallocated and the Netherlands could improve its performance by:

- increasing its allocations of education and basic education aid in CAFS and other LICs
- including education as part of humanitarian policy.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



New Zealand

23% ODA to education

46% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 96%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 7% in CAFS, 31% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 1.7%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$): Solomon Islands 11, Samoa 8, Tonga 6


New Zealand is now very close to meeting its fair share of the external financing requirement. However, it could improve its performance by:

- drastically increasing allocations of education aid to CAFS
- increasing priority for education in CAFS
- including education as part of humanitarian policy and response.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Norway

10% ODA to education

55% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 149%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 9% in CAFS, 13% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 2.6%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$): Madagascar 11, Tanzania 11, Nepal 10


Remains a strong performer and is fully meeting its fair share, and could use its strong position in education to influence other donors to meet their fair share also. However, a high proportion of aid is still not being committed to the countries most in need – CAFS and other LICs. Therefore, Norway still needs to:

- target aid at those countries most in need – CAFS and other LICs
- increase allocations of basic education aid to CAFS
- give greater priority to education in CAFS
- maintain commitments to education and increase its allocation to education in emergencies.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Portugal

12% ODA to education

12% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 15%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 6% in CAFS, 33% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 0%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):
Cape Verde 24
Angola 9
Timor Leste 9


Portugal continues to prioritise education in other LICs, allocating a high proportion of ODA to education in other LICs. However too much of its education aid continues to be spent on tertiary education, leaving little aid for basic education. Still needs to:

- drastically increase basic education aid to meet fair share of financing requirement
- give increased priority to education in CAFS
- include education as part of humanitarian policy and response.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Spain

9% ODA to education

32% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 21%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 4% in CAFS, 9% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 0.9%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):
Peru 11
Bolivia 11
Ecuador 10


Spain has made some progress on meeting its fair share since last year and has improved commitments to basic education. However, Spain still allocates a high proportion of its aid to MICs, leaving little for CAFS and other LICs. Spain therefore still needs to:

- drastically increase basic education aid to meet fair share of financing requirement
- increase allocations of education aid to CAFS and other LICs
- give greater priority to education in CAFS
- include education as part of humanitarian response and policy.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Sweden

6% ODA to education

55% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 85%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 10% in CAFS, 13% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 2.0%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):
 Bangladesh 20
 Afghanistan 20
 Mali 15


Significant progress has been made in actual amounts of education aid committed to CAFS, but still needs to:

- increase basic education aid in order to meet fair share of financing requirement
- maintain allocations of education aid to CAFS
- increase priority of education in CAFS.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Switzerland

4% ODA to education

40% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 17%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 1% in CAFS, 7% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education: 0.9%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):
 Bangladesh 4
 Burkina Faso 4
 Albania 2


While Switzerland allocates a reasonable proportion of its education aid to other LICs, overall volumes of education aid are too low. Therefore, still needs to:

- drastically increase basic education aid to meet fair share of financing requirement
- significantly increase allocations of education aid to CAFS
- increase priority of education in CAFS and other LICs
- include education as part of humanitarian policy and response.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



UK

11% ODA to education

75% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 98%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 5% in CAFS, 19% in other LICs

Humanitarian aid to education: 1.0%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):

India 137


Ghana 81

Bangladesh 72


A strong emphasis on financing primary education, with a large proportion of education aid allocated to other LICs. The significant increase in basic education aid commitments in 2006 to CAFS, is encouraging. However, the UK still needs to improve the equitable allocation of its aid by:

- increasing allocations of education aid to CAFS
- increasing priority of education in CAFS
- including education in humanitarian policy and response.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



USA

2% ODA to education

77% education aid to basic education

Fair share contribution to UPE financing requirement: 14%

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education): 2% in CAFS, 3% in other LICs

Humanitarian aid to education: 0.5%

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):

Iraq 101


Afghanistan 72

Pakistan 67


Although a good proportion of education aid goes to CAFS, only a very small proportion (2%) of aid overall goes to education. Still needs to:

- drastically increase basic education aid to meet fair share of financing requirement
- increase priority of education in CAFS and other LICs
- include education as part of humanitarian policy and response.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



European Commission

7% ODA to education
43% education aid to basic education

Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education):
4% in CAFS
10% in other LICs


Humanitarian aid to education:
0.4% (ECHO)
7.6% (EC)

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):
Tunisia 35
Turkey 33
India 27


As a lead education donor the EC could play a significant role in achieving the MDGs. However, to do this it needs to:

- increase aid to education and basic education by increasing its share of ODA to education and basic education
- increase allocations of education and basic education aid to CAFS
- increase priority for education in CAFS
- include education as part of humanitarian policy and response.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



World Bank IDA

13% ODA to education
57% education aid to basic education


Prioritisation of education (% ODA to education):
12% in CAFS
15% in other LICs

Top 3 recipients education aid (millions \$):
India 197
Bangladesh 129
Pakistan 107


A good supporter of education and basic education, the World Bank should improve its support for CAFS by:

- increasing allocations of education and basic education aid to CAFS
- increasing priority for education in CAFS.


Education aid commitments




Distribution of education aid in developing countries



Basic education aid commitments



Distribution of basic education aid



Appendix 3: Comparative table assessing donor performance and progress

This table provides comparative statistics illustrating the key changes to have taken place in donor support to CAFS since last year's report (Save the Children, 2007a).

Country	Fair Share contribution to UPE financing requirement (%)		Overall % ODA to education in CAFS		Distribution of Education Aid – CAFS % share		Distribution of Basic Education Aid – CAFS % share		Humanitarian Aid to Education (%)	
	Avg 03–05	Avg 04–06	Avg 03–05	Avg 04–06	Avg 03–05	Avg 04–06	Avg 03–05	Avg 04–06	Avg 03–06	Avg 04–07
All donors	–	–	4	5	18	18	23	23	1.5	1.6
Australia	34	29	1	0.4	2	1	3	1	6	4.5
Austria	5	5	1	1	5	5	15	14	0.3	0.3
Belgium	26	33	4	6	24	24	32	41	1.4	1.9
Canada	57	61	4	6	10	18	9	12	2.7	2.1
Denmark	71	81	12	9	24	25	36	41	3.8	4.8
Finland	52	53	11	9	22	19	33	30	1.7	1
France	20	21	5	5	10	11	8	10	0.2	0.2
Germany	16	18	4	4	11	10	14	16	1	1
Greece	27	4	20	23	11	22	8	52	0.2	0
Ireland	72	80	14	12	37	34	39	36	2.8	2.7
Italy	3	7	2	11	38	37	38	34	2	2.1
Japan	15	16	2	3	9	10	21	22	4.6	3.4

Country	Fair Share contribution to UPE financing requirement (%)		Overall % ODA to education in CAFS		Distribution of Education Aid – CAFS % share		Distribution of Basic Education Aid – CAFS % share		Humanitarian Aid to Education (%)	
	Avg 03–05	Avg 04–06	Avg 03–05	Avg 04–06	Avg 03–05	Avg 04–06	Avg 03–05	Avg 04–06	Avg 03–06	Avg 04–07
Luxembourg	86	113	2	3	2	2	3	3	0	0
Netherlands	165	441	4	9	7	6	4	4	2.9	2.3
New Zealand	74	96	5	7	3	4	3	2	2.1	1.7
Norway	163	149	9	9	24	24	25	29	2.5	2.6
Portugal	15	15	6	6	30	30	62	65	0.7	0
Spain	16	21	5	4	8	9	11	12	0.5	0.9
Sweden	93	85	6	10	18	30	18	44	2.7	2
Switzerland	17	17	2	1	9	5	8	7	1	0.9
UK	77	98	3	5	15	20	13	21	1.3	1
USA	14	14	2	2	40	48	49	53	0.4	0.5
European Commission	–	–	4	4	12	13	21	24	–	0.4
World Bank IDA	–	–	11	12	32	33	27	33	–	–

Appendix 4: Financing primary education in Afghanistan and the DRC

The two case studies from Afghanistan and the DRC presented below are based on research carried out by M Greeley for Save the Children in late 2007. For further information and the full case studies, please see Greeley (2007a) *Financing Primary Education in Afghanistan*, and Greeley (2007b) *Financing Primary Education in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*.

Financing primary education in Afghanistan

The impact of more than 30 years of conflict, isolation, underinvestment and the associated collapse of government, infrastructure and basic services such as health, education, water and sanitation have resulted in Afghanistan being one of the most fragile states in the world (Save the Children, 2007c). When nation-building restarted after 2001, the Afghanistan school infrastructure was largely destroyed and the education sector was in a state of collapse. There were less than one million children in school, and girls' enrolment was just 3%. Among many priorities, education was accorded special importance in Afghanistan's reconstruction,¹ and there has been a significant increase in enrolments, to more than six million children by 2006, with at least 35% of them being girls. Additionally, the number of teachers grew sevenfold, and more than 3,500 school buildings have been constructed. However, despite this progress, the education sector in Afghanistan faces significant challenges and constraints. In particular, the sector's management and administrative capacity to address matters of educational quality and access is limited, and education in Afghanistan is underfunded. The aggregate cost of the current five-year Education Strategy is estimated at \$2.6 billion, of which \$1.6bn

is required through development budget channels. Yet, "of the \$308m in development costs requested for 1386, the Ministry of Finance has supported an appropriation through the core budget of nearly \$92m, leaving a currently unfunded requirement of \$216 million for 1386" (Ministry of Education, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2007, p. 24).²

Donor support to education

The initial phase of donor support, from 2002 to 2006, was characterised by relatively weak capacity in the Ministry of Education (MoE). Consequently, this led to a diversity of poorly coordinated interventions from external partners. Nevertheless, there were impressive achievements in enrolment growth, and relatively strong donor support³ and increased aid for education. INGOs and national NGOs were important partners in much of this work, working either alone or through provincial and district education departments. These departments were themselves barely functional or with limited financial resources, but many were extremely dedicated, enthusiastic and effective within their limitations. With the production of a National Education Strategic Plan (NESP) in 2006, the basis for sector partnership has changed: now, with stronger ministry leadership, there is considerable donor and partner momentum behind support for ministry priorities. Existing and anticipated donor support has opened up the prospect of more effective and larger public investment. There is now evident will and commitment from the MoE to provide education for all children and, importantly, continuing will on the part of the donors to engage. This commitment is, of course, bolstered by Afghanistan's geopolitical significance and the belief that the security situation can be turned around.

What needs to change?

In order to build on the positive work of building systems and ministry capacity, donors and others need to continue to work together to ensure that the expansion of the education system continues in a way that ensures provision of good quality education, which overcomes the challenges of insecurity and works in a way that allows time for partnerships to change. Therefore, donors need to:

- support strategies for education delivery that work in insecure environments and where government systems are weak (eg, home-based schooling)
- allow time and be flexible in approaches while adjustments are made and partnerships are realigned, so that the MoE has oversight of the education sector. This means the MoE continuing to work with a range of implementing partners until it has developed the capacity to deliver education services itself
- increasingly, provide aid through government budgets rather than through project modes. However, during the transition, there needs to be a level of flexibility that enables partners within the education sector in Afghanistan to continue to work together. Technical assistance provided should address government capacity constraints, and state capacity can be built while delivery of services is ensured through a range of implementing partners
- increase investments in the education sector to match the needs. In March 2007 the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Jean Arnault, noted that “at a time when the number of children returning to school is surging, more resources are needed to keep up the momentum. A huge funding gap of some \$173 million exists for this year alone”.⁴

Financing primary education in the DRC

DRC is a country that has suffered years of neglect, plundering of natural resources, and conflict. Millions have died as a result of conflict, disease and hunger, and the current death rate is still put at over 1,000 per day. The educational challenges faced in DRC are massive, with large numbers of children out of school, primary completion rates as low as 29% (World Bank, 2004), weak capacity and systems in the Ministry of Education, under-qualified teachers, a shortage of instructional materials, and high fees leading to the exclusion of the country's poorest children.

Donor support to education

For years, donor engagement in the DRC has been limited, and disbursed mainly through humanitarian mechanisms. Support to education focused on textbooks, water and sanitation in schools, school construction and small NGO projects, with some wider-ranging interventions by UNICEF. Donor funds for education have been insufficient, given the DRC's substantial needs; quite simply, education has not been a priority for donors. However, they have started to re-engage dramatically over the last five years, although problems of poor financial governance, the burden of school fees and the absence of good data and of a sector strategy all conspire to restrict engagement in the education sector. Donors have been working closely with each other and with the government in order to move from emergency response to a more systematic approach to institutional reform, sector financing and, critically, addressing the issues of access and quality, as well as the school fee problem.

Encouragingly, there have been a number of recent commitments from donors, including a \$150m World Bank project to support school infrastructure rehabilitation, learning materials and the school fee issue. This project is tied to grant effectiveness conditions, which require a number of prior actions to be carried out. They include reform of teacher

pay mechanisms, school mapping and a teacher census. The grant effectiveness conditions have meant disbursement delays as a coherent reform process must be in place before funds are disbursed. DFID has invested a small portion of the £50m it committed in April 2007 in getting conditions in place for World Bank funding to be released. The delays to the World Bank project are frustrating for other donors, including DFID and Belgium Technical Cooperation, which want to engage further. The lack of any coherent sectoral policy and the politics surrounding policy-making have restricted donors' options to date. Conversely, NGOs have the capacity to do far more, but their funding is limited. NGOs and UNICEF have shown that they are able to deliver services as well as engage within a wider reform agenda.

While the current support from donors is welcome and vital for the long-term sustainability of the education sector, if they were more flexible they could utilise other channels. For example, channelling funds through not-for-profit organisations already working to support government systems would enable this generation of children to go to school today.

What needs to change?

Overall, the DRC's children need donors to be committed to ensuring the rapid delivery of a more reliable and coordinated education service and to supporting long-term sector reform. This means donors must address the constraints on realising rapid sector turnaround of state capacity and adopt flexible interim measures. They must focus both on immediate service delivery and on strengthening state capacity at provincial and lower levels to deliver free primary education to all of the DRC's children. In order to do this donors need to:

- build on successful models of direct intervention by NGOs in the most fragile and conflict-affected provinces in order to support the delivery of essential education services and sector reform activities

- speed up disbursements that will have an impact on education, even if in the short term it means looking to other implementing partners to support the education sector while government capacity is built
- use a flexible approach that addresses the short-term imperative to get children into school while building government capacity and systems for sustainability
- support decentralisation as a way to build capacity and education services at a local level: in a country as large as the DRC, and with volatile relationships between certain key geographic centres, there are potentially big gains from pursuing a decentralised approach.

Notes

¹ The importance of the education sector in state-building has frequently been underlined by the government as one of the most visible signs to its people that a committed leadership and a sustainable political system is there and working for their well-being.

² Note: Afghanistan follows the solar calendar and the Afghan year 1386 is equivalent to the year from 21 March 2007 to 20 March 2008.

³ Donor support encompassed the whole sector, with major investments in school construction, reconstruction and rehabilitation, teacher salaries, teacher training, curriculum development and textbooks. USAID, DFID, the World Bank, and the Afghanistan Multi-Donor Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) have been prominent financiers of the sector, but several other donors (including Denmark, Germany, Japan and Canada) have made bilateral contributions in addition to money through the ARTF.

⁴ UN News Centre (22 March, 2007) <http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusnews.asp?NewsID=675&csID=1>

Last in Line, Last in School 2008

How donors can support education for children affected by conflict and emergencies

Save the Children's 2007 publication *Last in Line, Last in School* exposed the international community's neglect of education in conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS). Since then, support for education for children living in countries affected by conflict and emergencies has risen up the political agenda, gaining prominence as an issue requiring urgent attention by donors. However, education in these countries continues to be severely underfunded and children in CAFS are still last in line for education.

Thirty-seven million children living in CAFS remain out of school, denied their right to education and the opportunity to lift themselves and their communities out of an endless cycle of poverty and conflict. With the capacity of their governments weakened, and education systems destroyed due to years of conflict and crisis, these children face a bleak future without external support.

Last in Line, Last in School 2008 demonstrates the urgent need for donors to increase aid for education in CAFS. It highlights the need for an international aid architecture that ensures long-term and sustainable aid for education during periods of conflict and emergency. World leaders have promised to provide education for all children by 2015. Only by taking immediate action to meet the needs of children living in countries affected by conflict and emergencies will they meet this goal.

International Save the Children Alliance
Cambridge House
Cambridge Grove
London W6 0LE
UK

www.savethechildren.net/rewritethefuture